

Asset Allocation Review and Risk Analysis

FCERS 3.21.24

Sequence of Returns Current Allocation with 2% Moved from Investment Grade Bonds to Long-Term Government Bonds

MEKETA

San Jose Federated City Employees' Retirement System

Sequence of Returns

Asset Allocation Policy Options¹

| | Current Policy (%) | 2 Percent IBG to LTGB (%) |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| Growth/Equity | 61 | 61 |
| US Equity | 25 | 25 |
| Developed Market Equity (non-US) | 12 | 12 |
| Emerging Market Equity | 12 | 12 |
| Buyouts | 8 | 8 |
| Venture Capital | 4 | 4 |
| Credit | 8 | 8 |
| High Yield Bonds | 2 | 2 |
| Private Debt | 3 | 3 |
| Emerging Market Bonds | 3 | 3 |
| Rate Sensitive | 17 | 17 |
| Cash Equivalents | 5 | 5 |
| Investment Grade Bonds | 8 | 6 |
| Long-term Government Bonds | 2 | 4 |
| TIPS | 2 | 2 |
| Real Assets | 11 | 11 |
| Core Private Real Estate | 5 | 5 |
| VA/Opp Private Real Estate | 3 | 3 |
| Private Real Assets | 3 | 3 |

¹ Expected return and standard deviation are based upon Meketa Investment Group's Annual Capital Markets Expectations. Throughout this document, returns for periods longer than one year are annualized.



Sequence of Returns

| Asset Allocation Policy Options ¹ (continue | d) |
|--|----|
|--|----|

| | Current Policy (%) | 2 Percent IBG to LTGB (%) |
|--|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| Other | 3 | 3 |
| Hedge Funds | 3 | 3 |
| Expected Return (20 years) | 8.52 | 8.53 |
| Standard Deviation | 13.4 | 13.4 |
| Probability of Achieving 6.62% over 20 Years | 73.5 | 73.8 |

¹ Expected return and standard deviation are based upon Meketa Investment Group's Annual Capital Markets Expectations. Throughout this document, returns for periods longer than one year are annualized.

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San Jose Federated City Employees' Retirement System

Sequence of Returns

Risk Analysis

| | Current Policy | 2 Percent IBG to LTGB |
|--|----------------|-----------------------|
| Scenario | (%) | (%) |
| Worst Case Returns | | |
| One Year (annualized) | -18.4 | -18.3 |
| Three Years (annualized) | -8.0 | -7.9 |
| Five Years (annualized) | -4.5 | -4.4 |
| Ten Years (annualized) | -0.9 | -0.8 |
| Twenty Years (annualized) | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| Probability of Experiencing Negative Returns | | |
| One Year | 25.3 | 25.2 |
| Three Years | 12.5 | 12.4 |
| Five Years | 6.9 | 6.8 |
| Ten Years | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| Twenty Years | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Probability of Achieving at least a 6.62% Return | | |
| One Year | 55.6 | 55.7 |
| Three Years | 59.6 | 59.7 |
| Five Years | 62.3 | 62.5 |
| Ten Years | 67.2 | 67.4 |
| Twenty Years | 73.5 | 73.8 |

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San Jose Federated City Employees' Retirement System

Sequence of Returns

| Scenario | Current Policy | 2 Percent IBG to LTGB |
|------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| VaR (%): | | |
| 1 month | -8.3 | -8.3 |
| 3 months | -13.4 | -13.4 |
| 6 months | -17.6 | -17.5 |
| VaR (\$M): | | |
| 1 month | -8 | -8 |
| 3 months | -13 | -13 |
| 6 months | -18 | -18 |

Value at Risk¹

Conditional Value at Risk¹

| Scenario | Current Policy | 2 Percent IBG to LTGB |
|-------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| CVaR (%): | | |
| 1 month | -9.6 | -9.5 |
| 3 months | -15.6 | -15.5 |
| 6 months | -20.7 | -20.6 |
| CVaR (\$M): | | |
| 1 month | -10 | -10 |
| 3 months | -16 | -16 |
| 6 months | -21 | -21 |

¹ Calculated with a 99% confidence level and based upon Meketa Investment Group's Annual Capital Markets Expectations. cVaR represents the average loss past the 99th percentile.



Sequence of Returns

Historical Negative Scenario Analysis¹ (Cumulative Return)

| Scenario | Current Policy (%) | 2 Percent IBG to LTGB (%) |
|---|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| Post-COVID Rate Hikes(Jan 2022-Oct 2023) | -9.5 | -10.0 |
| COVID-19 Market Shock (Feb 2020-Mar 2020) | -19.0 | -18.7 |
| Taper Tantrum (May - Aug 2013) | -0.5 | -0.6 |
| Global Financial Crisis (Oct 2007 - Mar 2009) | -28.9 | -28.6 |
| Popping of the TMT Bubble (Apr 2000 - Sep 2002) | -19.5 | -19.4 |
| LTCM (Jul - Aug 1998) | -9.9 | -9.8 |
| Asian Financial Crisis (Aug 97 - Jan 98) | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| Rate spike (1994 Calendar Year) | 2.2 | 2.1 |
| Early 1990s Recession (Jun - Oct 1990) | -6.6 | -6.6 |
| Crash of 1987 (Sep - Nov 1987) | -12.4 | -12.4 |
| Strong dollar (Jan 1981 - Sep 1982) | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Volcker Recession (Jan - Mar 1980) | -3.7 | -3.8 |
| Stagflation (Jan 1973 - Sep 1974) | -23.3 | -23.5 |

→ Moving 2% to Long-Term Government Bonds would be slightly protective during most negative market scenarios, except during highly inflationary/rate hike scenarios.

¹ See the Appendix for our scenario inputs. In periods where the ideal benchmark was not yet available we used the next closest benchmark(s) as a proxy.



Sequence of Returns

Historical Positive Scenario Analysis¹ (*Cumulative* Return)

| Scenario | Current Policy (%) | 2 Percent IBG to LTGB (%) |
|--|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| Covid Recovery (Apr 2020-Dec 2021) | 55.0 | 54.8 |
| Global Financial Crisis Recovery (Mar 2009 - Nov 2009) | 37.1 | 37.0 |
| Best of Great Moderation (Apr 2003 - Feb 2004) | 32.1 | 32.1 |
| Peak of the TMT Bubble (Oct 1998 - Mar 2000) | 61.4 | 61.4 |
| Plummeting Dollar (Jan 1986 - Aug 1987) | 57.8 | 57.8 |
| Volcker Recovery (Aug 1982 - Apr 1983) | 32.4 | 32.6 |
| Bretton Wood Recovery (Oct 1974 - Jun 1975) | 30.4 | 30.5 |

¹ See the Appendix for our scenario inputs. In periods where the ideal benchmark was not yet available we used the next closest benchmark(s) as a proxy.



Sequence of Returns

Stress Testing: Impact of Market Movements (Expected Return under Stressed Conditions)¹

| Scenario | Current Policy (%) | 2 Percent IBG to LTGB (%) |
|--|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| 10-year Treasury Bond rates rise 100 bps | 4.6 | 4.5 |
| 10-year Treasury Bond rates rise 200 bps | -1.3 | -1.5 |
| 10-year Treasury Bond rates rise 300 bps | -2.2 | -2.4 |
| Baa Spreads widen by 50 bps, High Yield by 200 bps | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| Baa Spreads widen by 300 bps, High Yield by 1000 bps | -22.8 | -22.7 |
| Trade Weighted Dollar gains 10% | -4.2 | -4.2 |
| Trade Weighted Dollar gains 20% | -1.9 | -1.7 |
| U.S. Equities decline 10% | -6.2 | -6.2 |
| U.S. Equities decline 25% | -17.6 | -17.5 |
| U.S. Equities decline 40% | -26.9 | -26.8 |

- → Each policy portfolio has a different sensitivity to four major risk factors: interest rates, credit spreads, currency fluctuations, and equity values.
- → The Fund's primary risk factors would continue to be an equity market decline and a widening of credit spreads, no matter the policy.

¹ Assumes that assets not directly exposed to the factor are affected nonetheless. See the Appendix for further details.



Sequence of Returns

Stress Testing: Impact of Positive Market Movements (Expected Return under Positive Conditions)¹

| Scenario | Current Policy (%) | 2 Percent IBG to LTGB (%) |
|---|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| 10-year Treasury Bond rates drop 100 bps | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| 10-year Treasury Bond rates drop 200 bps | 10.7 | 11.1 |
| 10-year Treasury Bond rates drop 300 bps | 13.5 | 14.0 |
| Baa Spreads narrow by 30bps, High Yield by 100 bps | 7.5 | 7.5 |
| Baa Spreads narrow by 100bps, High Yield by 300 bps | 14.0 | 14.0 |
| Trade Weighted Dollar drops 10% | 8.2 | 8.2 |
| Trade Weighted Dollar drops 20% | 23.0 | 23.3 |
| U.S. Equities rise 10% | 7.0 | 7.0 |
| U.S. Equities rise 30% | 16.9 | 16.9 |

¹ Assumes that assets not directly exposed to the factor are affected nonetheless. See the Appendix for further details.

Economic Regime Management[®]



Economic Regime Management®


Economic Regime Management

- → The Economic Regime Management (ERM) approach focuses on understanding the dynamics of the most important macro level forces that drive returns across asset classes.
- \rightarrow We find the most important factors to be:
 - Interest Rate Surprise Unexpected changes in the 10 year interest rate (related to Duration).
 - Inflation Surprise Unexpected changes in the CPI growth rate.
 - Growth Surprise Unexpected changes in the Real GDP growth rate.
 - Systemic Risk "System-wide" risk that propagates through all asset classes (e.g., 2008).
- \rightarrow We focus on surprises because expectations matter.
 - What was considered "low" inflation in the 1970s would be considered "high" today.
- \rightarrow These factors explain the majority of volatility across asset classes.
 - Understanding these dynamics explain the "why" not just the "what."



Economic Regime Management®





- → The chart above shows the resulting change in portfolio return given a one standard deviation event in the respective risk factor.
- → There is more concentration in Growth and Systematic Risk because these sources of risk tend to pay better (have higher expected returns) than the other risk factors.

Summary and Recommendations



Summary & Recommendations

Recommendations

→ Based on our analysis, shifting 2% of the current Investment Grade Bond assets to Long-Term Government Bonds seems to be reasonable to consider. The projections indicate that the move would be unlikely to hurt long-term returns, but would possibly protect some assets in negative market environments.

Appendices



Appendices

Scenario Return Inputs

| Asset Class | Benchmark Used |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Investment Grade Bonds | Bloomberg US Aggregate |
| TIPS | Bloomberg Global Inflation Linked: US TIPS |
| Intermediate-term Government Bonds | Bloomberg US Treasury: Intermediate |
| Long-term Government Bonds | Bloomberg US Treasury: Long |
| EM Bonds (Local) | Bloomberg Emerging Markets Hard Currency Aggregate |
| Bank Loans | Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan |
| High Yield Bonds | Bloomberg US Corporate High Yield |
| Direct Lending | Cliffwater Direct Lending Index |
| Special Situations | Cambridge Associates Proxy IRR Returns |
| Real Estate | NCREIF Property Index |
| Core Private Real Estate | Cambridge Associates Proxy IRR Returns |
| Value-Added Real Estate | Cambridge Associates Proxy IRR Returns |
| Opportunistic Real Estate | Cambridge Associates Proxy IRR Returns |
| REITs | FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITS |
| Infrastructure (Private) | Cambridge Associates Proxy IRR Returns |
| Natural Resources (Private) | Cambridge Associates Proxy IRR Returns |
| Timber | NCREIF Timberland |
| Commodities | Bloomberg Commodity Index |
| US Equity | Russell 3000 |
| Public Foreign Equity (Developed) | MSCI EAFE |
| Public Foreign Equity (Emerging) | MSCI Emerging Markets |
| Private Equity | Cambridge Associates Proxy IRR Returns |
| Long-short Equity | HFRI Equity Hedge |
| Global Macro | HFRI Macro |
| Hedge Funds | HFRI Fund Weighted Composite |
| | |



-0.4

Appendices

| | - | | | - | |
|-----------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|--|--|--------------------------|
| | Covid-19 Market Shock (Feb 2020-Mar 2020) | Taper Tantrum (May - Aug 2013) | Global Financial Crisis (Oct 2007 - Mar 2009) | Popping of the TMT Bubble (Apr 2000 - Sep 2002) | LTCM (Jul - Aug 1998) |
| Cash Equivalents | 0.4 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 9.9 | 0.8 |
| Short-term Investment Grade Bonds | 0.4 | -0.1 | 7.9 | 21.9 | 1.6 |
| Investment Grade Bonds | -0.9 | -3.7 | 8.5 | 28.6 | 1.8 |
| Long-term Corporate Bonds | -18.4 | -9.3 | -10.3 | 26.9 | -0.6 |
| Long-term Government Bonds | 12.7 | -11.6 | 24.2 | 35.5 | 4.1 |
| TIPS | -0.4 | -8.5 | 8.2 | 37.4 | 0.7 |
| Global ILBs | -6.5 | -7.4 | -3.9 | 39.7 | 0.7 |
| High Yield Bonds | -20.8 | -2.0 | -22.8 | -6.3 | -5.0 |
| Bank Loans | -20.3 | 0.8 | -23.7 | 6.3 | 0.7 |
| Direct Lending | -4.8 | 2.6 | -3.3 | -2.0 | -2.6 |
| Foreign Bonds | -4.5 | -3.2 | 2.1 | 8.5 | 3.5 |
| Asset Based Lending | -4.8 | 2.6 | -3.3 | -2.0 | -2.6 |
| Special Situations | -12.2 | 4.6 | -26.4 | -2.0 | -2.6 |
| Emerging Market Bonds (major) | -15.3 | -11.5 | -5.0 | 6.3 | -28.2 |
| Emerging Market Bonds (local) | -13.9 | -14.3 | -7.9 | 7.2 | -34.1 |
| US Equity | -35.0 | 3.0 | -45.8 | -43.8 | -15.4 |
| Developed Market Equity (non-US) | -32.7 | -2.2 | -52.1 | -46.7 | -11.5 |
| Emerging Market Equity | -31.2 | -9.4 | -51.2 | -43.9 | -26.7 |
| Global Equity | -33.6 | -0.7 | -49.3 | -46.7 | -14.0 |
| Private Equity/Debt | -7.8 | 5.7 | -27.7 | -23.6 | -3.2 |
| Private Equity | -7.4 | 5.8 | -28.2 | -26.2 | -3.3 |
| Private Debt Composite | -10.1 | 4.6 | -22.3 | -1.8 | -2.3 |
| REITs | -41.0 | -13.3 | -63.0 | 45.4 | -15.3 |
| Core Private Real Estate | 0.7 | 3.6 | -10.6 | 23.6 | 2.3 |
| Value-Added Real Estate | -3.5 | 3.0 | -32.2 | 25.4 | 0.0 |
| Opportunistic Real Estate | -8.6 | 4.0 | -25.7 | 21.4 | 1.5 |
| Natural Resources (Private) | -22.1 | 2.5 | -31.2 | -3.9 | -16.9 |
| Timberland | 0.1 | 1.3 | 20.7 | -1.5 | 0.5 |
| Farmland | -0.1 | 3.3 | 26.7 | 11.4 | 0.8 |
| Commodities (naïve) | -18.9 | -2.4 | -36.9 | 18.5 | -12.0 |
| Core Private Infrastructure | -1.3 | 3.7 | -0.8 | 24.8 | -0.3 |
| Hedge Funds | -9.1 | -0.4 | -17.8 | -2.1 | -9.4 |
| Long-Short | -10.9 | -1.0 | -26.4 | -8.8 | -8.3 |
| - | | | | | |

-19.5

-0.5

-7.6

Negative Historical Scenario Returns - Sample Inputs

Hedge Fund of Funds

-7.7



Appendices

Negative Historical Scenario Returns - Sample Inputs (continued)

| | Rate spike | Crash of 1987 | Strong dollar | Volcker Recession | Stagflation |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| | (1994 Calendar Year) | (Sep - Nov 1987) | (Jan 1981 - Sep 1982) | (Jan - Mar 1980) | (Jan 1973 - Sep 1974) |
| Cash Equivalents | 3.9 | 1.4 | 24.4 | 2.9 | 13.5 |
| Short-term Investment Grade Bonds | 0.5 | 2.3 | 29.9 | -2.6 | 4.3 |
| Investment Grade Bonds | -2.9 | 2.2 | 29.9 | -8.7 | 7.9 |
| Long-term Corporate Bonds | -5.8 | 1.5 | 29.6 | -14.1 | -12.0 |
| Long-term Government Bonds | -7.6 | 2.6 | 28.4 | -13.6 | -1.8 |
| TIPS | -7.5 | 2.8 | 15.6 | -7.8 | 4.3 |
| Global ILBs | -7.9 | 2.9 | 16.5 | -8.3 | 4.5 |
| ligh Yield Bonds | -1.0 | -3.6 | 6.9 | -2.3 | -15.5 |
| Bank Loans | 10.3 | -1.7 | 3.3 | -1.1 | -7.5 |
| Direct Lending | 7.6 | -2.3 | 3.2 | -1.0 | -7.2 |
| oreign Bonds | 5.3 | -0.3 | 34.8 | -6.5 | -1.4 |
| Asset Based Lending | 7.6 | -2.3 | 3.2 | -1.0 | -7.2 |
| Special Situations | 7.6 | -2.3 | 3.2 | -1.0 | -7.2 |
| merging Market Bonds (major) | -18.9 | -9.2 | -1.6 | -2.6 | -20.2 |
| merging Market Bonds (local) | -22.8 | -11.0 | -2.0 | -3.2 | -23.9 |
| JS Equity | 1.3 | -29.5 | -2.3 | -4.1 | -42.6 |
| Developed Market Equity (non-US) | 7.8 | -14.5 | -18.0 | -7.0 | -36.3 |
| Emerging Market Equity | -7.3 | -25.3 | -12.1 | -6.6 | -44.2 |
| Global Equity | 5.0 | -20.5 | -11.1 | -5.4 | -40.4 |
| Private Equity/Debt | 13.2 | -0.7 | -2.7 | -2.5 | -18.2 |
| Private Equity | 14.2 | -0.5 | -3.9 | -2.7 | -20.1 |
| Private Debt Composite | 6.2 | -1.8 | 3.0 | -1.0 | -6.9 |
| REITS | -3.5 | -19.5 | 2.5 | -3.6 | -33.9 |
| Core Private Real Estate | 6.4 | 2.5 | 23.9 | 5.5 | -4.4 |
| /alue-Added Real Estate | 6.5 | 4.3 | 44.2 | 9.6 | -7.6 |
| Opportunistic Real Estate | 18.8 | 3.1 | 30.7 | 7.0 | -5.6 |
| Natural Resources (Private) | 12.6 | -9.9 | -9.5 | -9.1 | 19.3 |
| - imberland | 15.4 | 9.2 | 23.6 | -7.4 | 5.5 |
| armland | 9.4 | 5.3 | 13.3 | -4.2 | 3.1 |
| Commodities (naïve) | 16.6 | 1.8 | -16.0 | -9.6 | 139.5 |
| Core Private Infrastructure | -11.5 | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.1 | -0.5 |
| ledge Funds | 4.1 | -7.8 | -3.8 | -1.9 | -15.7 |
| .ong-Short | 2.6 | -10.0 | -4.9 | -2.5 | -19.8 |
| ledge Fund of Funds | -3.5 | -5.7 | -2.7 | -1.4 | -11.5 |



Appendices

| Covid-19 Recovery Crisis Recover Moderation (Apr 2020 - (Mar 2009 - (Apr 2003 - Dec 2021) Nov 2009) Feb 2004) | Bubble (Oct 1998 - Mar 2000) | Plummeting Dollar (Jan 1986 - Aug 1987) | Volcker Recovery (Aug 1982 - Apr 1983) | Bretton Wood Recovery (Oct 1974 - Jun 1975) |
|---|------------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Cash Equivalents 0.1 0.1 0.9 | 6.7 | 10.0 | 6.0 | 4.5 |
| Short-term Investment Grade Bonds 1.1 4.3 2.8 | 5.3 | 13.2 | 15.4 | 5.0 |
| Investment Grade Bonds 2.6 9.0 4.6 | 1.7 | 14.4 | 26.4 | 9.2 |
| Long-term Corporate Bonds 18.0 28.8 11.3 | -3.1 | 15.9 | 42.1 | 17.5 |
| Long-term Government Bonds-7.22.04.9 | -2.3 | 15.4 | 33.6 | 11.8 |
| TIPS 15.6 14.3 9.1 | 6.3 | 10.2 | 11.5 | 4.1 |
| Global ILBs 18.9 24.7 9.6 | 6.6 | 10.8 | 12.1 | 4.3 |
| High Yield Bonds 29.1 49.1 21.8 | 2.1 | 24.9 | 23.3 | 19.3 |
| Bank Loans 24.8 32.9 10.1 | 6.1 | 11.1 | 10.4 | 8.7 |
| Direct Lending 25.0 9.4 23.7 | 26.8 | 5.4 | 8.2 | 8.3 |
| Foreign Bonds 5.2 23.4 15.2 | -7.0 | 44.5 | 32.3 | 17.9 |
| Asset Based Lending 25.0 9.4 23.7 | 26.8 | 5.4 | 8.2 | 8.3 |
| Special Situations 85.8 33.2 23.7 | 26.8 | 5.4 | 8.2 | 8.3 |
| Emerging Market Bonds (major) 15.7 27.0 20.6 | 49.0 | 38.9 | 21.6 | 21.0 |
| Emerging Market Bonds (local) 7.0 37.5 25.2 | 61.0 | 48.4 | 26.5 | 25.7 |
| US Equity 92.0 51.6 37.2 | 50.2 | 64.8 | 59.3 | 55.1 |
| Developed Market Equity (non-US) 55.4 60.5 56.7 | 53.0 | 140.0 | 29.6 | 34.6 |
| Emerging Market Equity 50.9 94.6 79.4 | 101.3 | 126.5 | 52.1 | 53.4 |
| Global Equity 75.2 59.9 46.2 | 54.8 | 98.7 | 46.3 | 43.8 |
| Private Equity/Debt 97.8 18.8 23.3 | 82.4 | 19.0 | 13.7 | 18.4 |
| Private Equity 101.5 16.7 23.7 | 90.0 | 21.6 | 14.8 | 20.2 |
| Private Debt Composite 41.2 28.7 20.4 | 21.3 | 5.9 | 7.9 | 8.0 |
| REITS 75.1 82.5 44.6 | -5.2 | 51.8 | 47.4 | 42.5 |
| Core Private Real Estate 21.4 -12.1 9.0 | 18.1 | 13.1 | 6.8 | 4.5 |
| Value-Added Real Estate 36.6 -22.4 10.9 | 22.0 | 23.6 | 11.9 | 7.8 |
| Opportunistic Real Estate 41.1 -14.8 13.6 | 27.9 | 16.7 | 8.6 | 5.7 |
| Natural Resources (Private) 45.4 57.6 36.1 | 22.2 | 78.3 | 30.2 | 14.8 |
| Timberland 9.9 -3.7 8.5 | 20.5 | 28.6 | 20.0 | 8.7 |
| Farmland 11.3 4.5 9.6 | 10.4 | 15.9 | 11.3 | 5.0 |
| Commodities (naïve) 60.5 28.9 30.6 | 17.1 | 27.6 | 6.2 | -20.2 |
| Core Private Infrastructure32.76.98.5 | 33.0 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Hedge Funds 39.3 20.1 22.4 | 52.8 | 30.6 | 13.8 | 14.5 |
| Long-Short 54.1 25.9 25.3 | 81.4 | 40.8 | 18.0 | 18.9 |
| Hedge Fund of Funds 29.1 10.3 13.3 | 36.8 | 21.3 | 9.7 | 10.3 |

Positive Historical Scenario Returns - Sample Inputs



Appendices

| | 10-year Treasury Bond rates rise | 10-year Treasury Bond rates rise | 10-year Treasury Bond rates rise | Baa Spreads widen by 50 bps, High Yield | Baa Spreads widen by 300 bps, High Yield | Trade Weighted Dollar gains | Trade Weighted Dollar gains | US Equities decline | US Equities decline 25% | US Equities decline |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|--|---|--|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| | 100 bps | 200 bps | 300 bps | by 200 bps | by 1000 bps | 10% | 20% | 10% | - | 40% |
| Cash Equivalents | -0.2 | -0.4 | -0.5 | 2.8 | 1.1 | 3.6 | 1.3 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 0.4 |
| Short-term Investment Grade Bonds | -1.2 | -2.5 | -3.7 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
| Investment Grade Bonds | -4.3 | -8.4 | -11.9 | 3.9 | -0.4 | 0.8 | 4.2 | 1.5 | 0.7 | -1.0 |
| Long-term Corporate Bonds | -8.9 | -16.3 | -20.9 | 2.6 | -13.4 | -1.0 | 8.1 | -1.0 | -8.3 | -12.3 |
| Long-term Government Bonds | -10.6 | -18.9 | -23.6 | 7.8 | 7.3 | 1.8 | 12.8 | 1.4 | 2.6 | 2.4 |
| TIPS | -4.9 | -9.8 | -13.7 | 2.8 | -6.1 | -2.4 | -0.2 | 1.8 | -2.3 | -8.7 |
| Global ILBs | -1.6 | -8.6 | -11.9 | 2.4 | -11.1 | -4.0 | -4.8 | 1.4 | -5.4 | -16.3 |
| High Yield Bonds | 2.6 | -4.3 | -3.6 | -1.8 | -23.0 | -4.1 | -0.6 | -5.3 | -15.5 | -21.2 |
| Bank Loans | 1.4 | -1.0 | -5.1 | -2.8 | -20.8 | -2.9 | -0.6 | -3.6 | -13.2 | -17.4 |
| Direct Lending | 0.1 | -2.7 | -6.3 | -1.8 | -9.1 | -3.2 | -0.6 | -3.4 | -7.6 | -5.7 |
| Foreign Bonds | -4.6 | -9.9 | -15.7 | 6.6 | -2.9 | -4.5 | -8.8 | 0.4 | -4.6 | -9.2 |
| Asset-Based Lending | -0.2 | -2.5 | -4.5 | -1.4 | -11.5 | -3.4 | -3.1 | -3.3 | -8.2 | -6.0 |
| Special Situations | 4.6 | 0.0 | -6.4 | -2.2 | -21.4 | -1.6 | -9.0 | -4.3 | -17.3 | -21.8 |
| Emerging Market Bonds (major) | 0.8 | -6.1 | -3.6 | -0.1 | -14.7 | -2.6 | -4.2 | -4.2 | -12.5 | -15.4 |
| Emerging Market Bonds (local) | 1.6 | -6.4 | -3.0 | 0.1 | -12.8 | -3.0 | -12.2 | -3.8 | -13.3 | -20.5 |
| US Equity | 7.1 | -1.0 | 2.8 | -1.2 | -32.0 | -3.5 | 1.6 | -10.6 | -26.5 | -42.4 |
| Developed Market Equity (non-US) | 8.9 | 0.7 | -5.6 | 0.3 | -35.1 | -13.2 | -9.0 | -8.8 | -23.4 | -41.4 |
| Emerging Market Equity | 10.0 | 2.3 | 0.1 | -1.1 | -42.8 | -15.7 | -15.7 | -11.7 | -30.8 | -46.9 |
| Global Equity | 7.6 | -0.1 | -0.5 | -0.7 | -33.6 | -9.1 | -5.9 | -9.8 | -25.3 | -41.5 |
| Private Equity/Debt | 6.5 | 0.9 | -5.5 | -0.2 | -22.5 | -2.9 | -7.2 | -9.2 | -22.5 | -25.3 |
| Private Equity | 6.8 | 0.9 | -5.3 | 0.0 | -22.8 | -2.8 | -6.4 | -10.0 | -23.3 | -25.7 |
| Private Debt Composite | 2.6 | -1.3 | -6.2 | -1.8 | -15.8 | -2.4 | -4.3 | -4.0 | -12.8 | -15.0 |
| REITs | 4.1 | -4.4 | 1.2 | -3.8 | -37.3 | -1.6 | 12.4 | -7.1 | -32.8 | -55.7 |
| Core Private Real Estate | 2.6 | 4.2 | 5.0 | 2.0 | -7.1 | 2.7 | 9.7 | 1.0 | -8.5 | -14.0 |
| Value-Added Real Estate | 4.9 | 7.5 | 14.1 | 7.2 | -13.5 | 13.7 | 6.4 | 1.9 | -13.6 | -23.1 |
| Opportunistic Real Estate | 4.2 | 6.9 | 9.9 | 1.1 | -20.6 | 2.3 | 15.6 | -0.6 | -17.1 | -26.3 |
| Natural Resources (Private) | 13.3 | 6.9 | -3.5 | -0.9 | -27.5 | -4.3 | -21.5 | -2.1 | -17.0 | -29.1 |
| Timberland | 1.5 | 2.3 | -9.9 | 5.0 | 6.9 | 2.9 | 8.6 | 0.6 | 2.7 | 3.9 |
| Farmland | 2.5 | 0.7 | -9.2 | 3.9 | 10.1 | 1.3 | 8.0 | 1.0 | 4.9 | 10.3 |
| Commodities (naïve) | 9.9 | 6.0 | -6.6 | -4.3 | -25.0 | -3.4 | -24.0 | 5.1 | -11.1 | -37.8 |
| Core Private Infrastructure | 0.5 | -4.6 | -6.1 | 1.2 | 0.1 | -0.7 | 3.6 | -0.4 | -5.0 | -7.8 |
| Hedge Funds | 2.9 | -1.8 | -5.1 | -0.6 | -14.5 | -2.2 | -1.7 | -4.3 | -12.2 | -15.7 |
| Long-Short | 5.2 | -1.8 | -4.2 | -0.1 | -21.0 | -3.7 | -4.3 | -7.5 | -17.7 | -23.5 |
| Hedge Fund of Funds | 2.1 | -2.4 | -5.7 | -1.3 | -14.8 | -2.9 | -2.4 | -4.9 | -12.5 | -16.0 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |

Stress Test Return Assumptions - Sample Inputs¹

¹ Assumptions are based on performance for each asset class during historical periods that resembled these situations.



Appendices

| | 10-year Treasury Bond rates drop 100 bps | 10-year Treasury Bond rates drop 200 bps | Baa Spreads narrow by 30bps, High Yield by 100 bps | Baa Spreads narrow by 100bps, High Yield by 300 bps | Trade Weighted Dollar drops 10% | Trade Weighted Dollar drops 20% | US Equities rise 10% | US Equities rise 30% |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|---|--|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Cash Equivalents | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 2.0 | 4.5 | 2.3 | 3.1 |
| Short-term Investment Grade Bonds | 1.3 | 2.6 | 0.5 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 3.3 | 0.8 | 1.6 |
| Investment Grade Bonds | 4.5 | 9.3 | 1.3 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 9.4 | 1.8 | 3.8 |
| Long-term Corporate Bonds | 10.5 | 23.4 | 3.9 | 14.5 | 5.6 | 15.8 | 3.6 | 7.7 |
| Long-term Government Bonds | 13.3 | 28.8 | 0.6 | -0.6 | 1.8 | 22.2 | 3.6 | 5.7 |
| TIPS | 5.2 | 10.9 | 1.2 | 5.9 | 3.8 | 7.8 | 1.5 | 2.2 |
| Global ILBs | 3.0 | 6.4 | 2.1 | 7.4 | 5.9 | 8.4 | 1.7 | 3.2 |
| High Yield Bonds | 2.8 | 8.9 | 7.0 | 25.7 | 7.7 | 8.6 | 4.8 | 10.6 |
| Bank Loans | -0.2 | 2.2 | 4.0 | 16.4 | 4.3 | 0.6 | 2.2 | 4.5 |
| Direct Lending | -0.5 | 0.2 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 1.5 | 3.8 | 1.8 | 3.5 |
| Foreign Bonds | 5.7 | 11.3 | 1.6 | 7.4 | 9.9 | 21.3 | 2.3 | 6.8 |
| Asset Based Lending | -0.6 | 1.5 | 3.4 | 4.8 | 1.0 | 5.9 | 1.8 | 5.0 |
| Special Situations | 1.2 | 2.9 | 9.5 | 17.1 | 6.8 | 7.8 | 6.2 | 10.0 |
| Emerging Market Bonds (major) | 3.1 | 7.4 | 5.5 | 15.5 | 7.4 | 15.4 | 5.5 | 11.1 |
| Emerging Market Bonds (local) | 3.7 | 9.9 | 5.5 | 17.6 | 10.5 | 19.4 | 6.1 | 13.2 |
| US Equity | 3.4 | 15.3 | 11.4 | 18.8 | 8.0 | 24.9 | 10.6 | 31.7 |
| Developed Market Equity (non-US) | -2.4 | 16.4 | 9.4 | 18.3 | 13.4 | 47.6 | 6.4 | 18.8 |
| Emerging Market Equity | 0.5 | 17.8 | 9.5 | 34.3 | 20.1 | 47.9 | 9.3 | 28.9 |
| Global Equity | 0.7 | 15.2 | 9.6 | 19.6 | 11.3 | 35.9 | 8.6 | 25.7 |
| Private Equity/Debt | 2.4 | 4.4 | 10.5 | 9.5 | 7.4 | 16.7 | 10.5 | 13.6 |
| Private Equity | 2.5 | 4.3 | 10.6 | 8.3 | 7.3 | 17.3 | 11.1 | 14.3 |
| Private Debt Composite | 0.8 | 1.8 | 7.7 | 12.8 | 4.8 | 5.9 | 4.6 | 6.5 |
| REITs | 2.6 | 14.5 | 9.7 | 27.1 | 6.5 | 25.5 | 10.0 | 24.1 |
| Core Private Real Estate | 1.0 | 1.6 | 4.6 | -3.5 | 1.2 | 5.5 | 3.0 | 3.6 |
| Value-Added Real Estate | 2.7 | 6.4 | 5.6 | -9.4 | 0.9 | 12.6 | 6.0 | 7.4 |
| Opportunistic Real Estate | 0.1 | 3.9 | 5.9 | -5.5 | -0.4 | 11.4 | 4.7 | 6.2 |
| Natural Resources (Private) | -1.1 | 11.3 | 10.2 | 31.0 | 16.9 | 27.2 | 7.6 | 15.0 |
| Timberland | 6.4 | 9.2 | 4.9 | -0.6 | 3.8 | 12.9 | 6.4 | 5.5 |
| Farmland | 3.2 | 4.2 | 6.6 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 7.8 | 5.3 | 4.1 |
| Commodities (naïve) | -2.6 | -3.2 | 3.1 | 9.8 | 13.6 | -2.5 | 3.1 | 4.0 |
| Core Private Infrastructure | 0.8 | -4.3 | 7.0 | 4.8 | 3.5 | -2.3 | 2.0 | 2.9 |
| Hedge Funds | 3.3 | 4.8 | 5.8 | 11.3 | 6.0 | 9.3 | 5.6 | 9.8 |
| Long-Short | 3.3 | 5.8 | 6.9 | 12.3 | 7.8 | 15.2 | 7.0 | 13.3 |
| Hedge Fund of Funds | 2.5 | 3.9 | 4.9 | 10.2 | 5.1 | 8.3 | 4.7 | 8.8 |

'Anti' Stress Test Return Assumptions - Sample Inputs¹

¹ Assumptions are based on performance for each asset class during historical periods that resembled these situations.

MEKETA

San Jose Federated City Employees' Retirement System

Appendices

Disclosure

You understand and agree that this document is partly based on analysis conducted using Meketa's the Asset Allocation Tool ("AAT"), an interactive tool created by Meketa Investment Group, Inc. ("Meketa") for informational purposes only and is not intended to provide, and should not be relied on for, accounting, legal, tax, or investment advice. The tool generates outcomes that are hypothetical in nature and should not be considered as providing advice on which investments to buy or sell. Results may vary with each use and over time. Specifically, the results may vary if the user modifies the inputs or there are changes to the capital markets assumptions. Information contained herein is subject to change at any time without notice.

The majority of the underlying data is updated annually, with a significant portion based on our capital markets expectations (CMEs). The CME include forecasts for each asset class over a 10-year and 20-year horizon for expected return, standard deviation, and covariance. These forecasts do not represent predictions for any fund or strategy. These forecasts are forward-looking projections based upon the reasonable beliefs of Meketa and are not a guarantee of future performance. Forward-looking projections relate only to the date they are made, and Meketa assumes no duty to and does not generally undertake to update forward-looking statements outside of our standard annual CME update. Further, forward-looking projections are subject to numerous assumptions, risks, and uncertainties, which change over time. Actual results may differ materially from those anticipated in forward-looking projections.

Historical data published herein may be simulated or backdated using reasonable beliefs of available historical data and, in such instances, no allowance has necessarily been made for trading costs, management fees, implementation shortfalls or other costs, are not indicative of any specific investment, are unmanaged and cannot be invested in directly. Note there are specific modules and information in the tool that provide modeling analysis that includes reasonable assumptions, management fees, active management, etc. Past performance, including simulated or backdated performance, is no guarantee of future performance, and actual investment results will likely differ. Any information and data pertaining to an index contained in this document relate only to the index itself and not to any asset management product based on the index. All information and data are generally based on information and data from third party sources. Hypothetical or simulated performance results have certain inherent limitations. Unlike an actual performance record, hypothetical results do not represent actual trading, but are based on the historical returns of the selected investments, indices or investment classes and various assumptions of past and future events.

All projections provided are estimates and are in US dollar terms, unless otherwise specified, and are based on data as of the dates indicated. Given the complex risk-reward trade-offs involved, one should always rely on judgment in addition to any analysis in setting strategic allocations to any



Appendices

or all of the asset classes specified. All information shown is based on both quantitative and qualitative analysis developed by Meketa. The asset class and strategy assumptions contained herein are primarily passive — they do not consider the impact of active management, though a specific model in the tool is designed to contemplate the use of active management. References to future returns are not promises of actual returns a client portfolio may achieve. Assumptions, opinions, and estimates are provided for illustrative purposes only. Forecasts of financial market trends that are based on current market conditions or historical data constitute a judgment and are subject to change without notice. We do not warrant their accuracy or completeness. There is no assurance that any of the market values displayed will be attained.

The return characteristics and behavior of asset classes are represented by broad-based indices that have been selected because they are well known and are easily recognizable by investors. The AAT does not favor certain asset classes. The AAT is intended to illustrate the possible trade-offs between portfolios composed of various assets. The behavior modeled for an asset class may differ from an actual portfolio. For example, investments made for a portfolio may differ significantly in terms of security holdings, industry weightings, and asset allocation, from those of the asset class. Further, other asset classes not considered may have characteristics similar or superior to those being analyzed by the AAT.

No investment process is risk free and there is no guarantee of profitability; investors may lose some or all of their investments. No investment strategy or risk management technique can guarantee returns or eliminate risk in any market environment. Diversification does not guarantee a profit or protect against loss. Asset classes vary significantly in projected returns and volatility.

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Notes and Disclaimers

- ¹ The returns shown in the Policy Options and Risk Analysis sections rely on estimates of expected return, standard deviation, and correlation developed by Meketa Investment Group. To the extent that actual return patterns to the asset classes differ from our expectations, the results in the table will be incorrect. However, our inputs represent our best unbiased estimates of these simple parameters.
- ² The returns shown in the Policy Options and Risk Analysis sections use a lognormal distribution, which may or may not be an accurate representation of each asset classes' future return distribution. To the extent that it is not accurate in whole or in part, the probabilities listed in the table will be incorrect. As an example, if some asset classes' actual distributions are even more right-skewed than the lognormal distribution (i.e., more frequent low returns and less frequent high returns), then the probability of the portfolio hitting a given annual return will be lower than that stated in the table.
- ³ The standard deviation bars in the chart in the Risk Analysis section do not indicate the likelihood of a 1, 2, or 3 standard deviation event—they simply indicate the return we expect if such an event occurs. Since the likelihood of such an event is the same across allocations regardless of the underlying distribution, a relative comparison across policy choices remains valid.